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FINANCIAL PANIC, FAMINE, AND CONTAGION: 
Cormac Ó Gráda (University College Dublin) 
 
1. BEGINNINGS 
  Savings banks in the United Kingdom lack the glamour of contemporaneous 
innovations such as the power-loom or the railway engine.  What could be duller that the 
story of institutions that didn’t even expose themselves to the risk of lending money and 
which for the most part were cautiously and competently run?  Yet savings banks are 
worth studying, if less for their own sake than for what they can tell us about the economy 
and economic behaviour more broadly.  This paper uses the records of a nineteenth-
century Irish savings bank to shed some light on the role of financial institutions and 
financial panics associated with them in backward economies.  This section offers a brief 
introduction to the history of savings banks in Ireland (Part 1).  I then describe one well-
documented bank, the Thurles Savings Bank (Part 2).  In Parts 3 and 4 I discuss the 
impact of two financial panics on the Thurles Savings Bank.  Part 5 concludes. 
During the Industrial Revolution there was no shortage of schemes particularly 
directed at ‘industrious and frugal’ servants and tradesmen, and more generally at those 
who might easily be reduced to destitution by unemployment, illness, or old age.  In 1793 
the British parliament passed a scheme to promote friendly societies, but such societies 
were soon being criticised for being wasteful and too narrowly focused.  Of several 
schemes to encourage working-class thrift the most important would prove to be the 
provident institution or trustee savings bank.  The foundation of the savings bank 
movement is usually dated to 1810 in Ruthwell, a small village in lowland Scotland.  The 
new concept spread very rapidly throughout the UK and indeed further afield.1  It became  3 
fashionable for the middle classes and the gentry to be involved in banks as trustees, 
patrons, or part-time managers.  Their desire to make the poor industrious was coupled 
with a self-interested concern to reduce the nuisances of poor relief and street begging.  
The system thus embodied a paternalism that seemed to unite the interest of rich and 
poor.   
  So influential was the support for the new institutions in the United Kingdom at 
the outset that parliamentary backing was soon forthcoming.  Separate acts to encourage 
the spread of savings banks in Ireland and in England fixed the rate of interest payable at a 
very generous 3d per cent per diem or 4.55 per cent per annum, limited depositors to 
investments of £50 per annum in Ireland and £100 in Britain, and exempted bank 
transactions from stamp duties.  [These rates and limits would change later.]  They also 
prohibited trustees from having a financial interest in a savings bank.  As a confidence-
building measure the legislation also stipulated that the banks’ deposits be placed on 
account with the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt.   
  Some radicals (e.g. William Cobbett) viewed the savings banks as a cunning way of 
getting rid of the entitlement to poor relief.  While undoubtedly some supporters of 
savings banks were hard-line Malthusians who wanted an end to all poor relief, there is 
also a distinction between entitlement and the need for relief.  More soundly based was the 
critique that the banks really were not helping those for whom they were intended, and 
that the benefits were being captured by the middle and lower-middle classes.  This is a 
point that would be rediscovered in the 1950s and 1960s by Neil Smelser and Albert 
Fishlow.2 
The new institutions relied on a combination of public and private subsidy.  They 
aimed to offer their clients three things: a relatively attractive return on their savings,  4 
considerable liquidity, and security.  In the mid-1810s they spread like wildfire.  By the end 
of 1818 there were nearly five hundred savings banks in Great Britain.  Diffusion tapered 
off thereafter.  In Ireland diffusion lagged, but only very slightly, behind the rest of the 
UK.3  As in Britain the banks relied on local grandees to lend prestige, and on clergymen, 
and professionals and businessmen to provide the initiative and to act as trustees or 
managers.  This sense of noblesse oblige (or its bourgeois equivalent) was a crucial aspect.  In 
general the management was ecumenical in composition.   
  Ireland’s first successful savings bank, the Belfast Savings Bank, opened for 
business in January 1816.  Thereafter though Ulster took the lead, banks were soon set up 
throughout the island.  By late 1829 there were seventy-three of them.  On the eve of the 
famine there were nearly one hundred thousand depositors in seventy-six savings banks 
holding balances totalling nearly £3 million.  The Irish savings bank network had been 
essentially established by the mid-1820s.  Of the seventy-four Irish banks still open in late 
1846 forty-six had been created in 1816-25, a further twenty-one in 1826-35, and only 
seven from 1836 on.  Long-established banks best withstood the pressures of the late 
1840s (on which more later).  Of the fifty-two founded before 1826 six had gone by the 
wayside by 1848; of the twenty-nine founded in 1926-35, eight failed by 1848; of the 
twelve founded in 1836 or later, five had folded by 1848.  The earlier savings banks were 
also bigger.    
  On the eve of the famine the population of Ireland was more than half that of 
England & Wales, and more than double that of Scotland.  Yet Ireland had only half as 
many savings banks as Scotland, and about one-sixth as many as England and Wales.  Part 
of the reason for this is that banks fared best in urban settings, whereas Ireland was 
overwhelmingly rural.  The banks were more likely to be located in the more developed  5 
parts of the country.  On the eve of the famine the province of Connacht, poorest and 
least urbanised and worst affected by the famine, had 17 per cent of the population but 
only 4 per cent of the savings held in savings banks. So, ironically, the banks were fewest 
where the really poor were most numerous.  The initial motivation behind the banks and 
their parliamentary supporters was to get the poor to save.  In this respect their record was 
mixed at best.  Qualitative accounts suggest that the lower-middle and middle classes were 
the main beneficiaries.  Hard data on the savers’ socio-economic status confirm such 
impressions (Ó Gráda 2003).   
  
 
2. THURLES SAVINGS BANK 
  Thurles Savings Bank (henceforth ThSB) opened for business in late 1829 and 
folded in 1871 (O’Shea 1989).   The decision to create the bank was taken at a meeting of 
‘those Gentlemen who are disposed to lend their Aid...for the Benefit of the Town and 
Neighbourhood ’.  Its trustees and managers were mainly local clergymen, landed 
proprietors, and professional people.  There was just about enough of a ‘leisure class’ in 
Thurles and its hinterland to sustain it.  The local Protestant clergy were particularly active 
in its affairs, with Archdeacon Cotton involved from beginning to end.  In the early years 
James Butler M.D. and Rev. Dr. Thomas O’Connor, first president of St. Patrick’s College, 
a junior seminary established in 1837, also played prominent roles.  When Thomas Kirwan 
resigned as treasurer in November 1833 he was thanked by fellow managers ‘for zealous 
and efficient discharge of the duties of his office for four years to which is mainly to be 
attributed the progressive improvement of the Bank’.  Most of its officers were long-
serving.  Between 1829 and 1859 the bank had only three treasurers (after which the  6 
National Bank fulfilled the function), and local shopkeeper, stamp-seller, and stationer 
Matthew Quinlan served as part-time actuary from beginning to end, on a salary that 
varied with the volume of business.  However, only a minority of the twenty trustees 
nominated at the outset played any significant part in ThSB’s operations, and some seem 
never to have attended a quarterly trustees’ meeting.  In effect at any one time the bank 
was run by a group of six to eight people, and attendance at the trustees’ quarterly 
meetings rarely exceeded five or six (O’Shea 1981: 96-7; ThSB board minutes). 
  Uniquely for Ireland, the records of ThSB survive almost in their entirety.  The 
bank was representative of banks in middle-sized towns like Thurles, though its deposits 
were slightly on the high side.   A feature was the particularly high percentage of savers in 
the £20-£50 bracket: 52 per cent of all accounts in Thurles, against 38 per cent nationally 
in November 1846.  Throughout its lifetime the bank opened only once a week, on 
Mondays between 1 and 2 p.m.  Over its lifetime the bank received £187,057 10s 6d in 
4,213 accounts opened in the names of individuals, as well as another fifty-one 
representing voluntary organisations or charitable institutions (Ó Gráda 2003).   
   The ThSB’s ledgers corroborate the point about the banks being mainly a vehicle 
for the more comfortable and better off.  Thurles held over four thousand accounts in all.  
The spread of opening lodgements is worth remarking on (Figure 1).  More than one 
lodgement in three (1,630 out of 4,213) was for exactly the maximum permitted sum of 
£30.  Note too the peaks at £5, £10, and £20.  Quite plainly children’s accounts were used 
to overcome the regulation that no single account be augmented by more that £30 in a 
single year.  The opening deposits in trust accounts tended to be bigger than average.  
Only 8.5 per cent of them were of £5 or under, compared to 18.5 per cent of all opening 
deposits.  Moreover, nearly three-fifths of the opening deposits of exactly £30 were trust  7 
accounts, and a much higher proportion of trust accounts (52.6 per cent) were at the upper 
limit of £30. 
  Between 1829 and the beginnings of the Great Famine in 1846, deposits in ThSB 
exceeded withdrawals in each year with the exception of 1840 and 1842.  However, in 
1834-36 there were substantial withdrawals (£11,265 against £14,340 deposited).   This 
may well have been due to the opening of a branch of the National Bank in the town in 
1835 and a branch of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank in the following year.  The 
opening of a branch of the new Tipperary Joint Stock Bank (on which more later) in 1840 
also drew some drawn accounts away from ThSB.  As in England, reductions in the rate of 
interest paid on deposits in savings banks also probably had something to do with it.  The 
sensitivity of deposits to alternative outlets for funds is significant. 
  Note first of all that the two main poor categories, labourers and servants, were 
underrepresented.  Labourers accounted for half the labour force on the eve of the Great 
Famine, but for only one saver in fifty.  In effect ThSB was a farmers’ bank.  More than 
one account holder in four was described as a farmer or a member of a farming family, 
and it is clear from the ledgers that a significant number of those described merely as 
‘minors’, ‘spinsters’, ‘widows’, and ‘married women’ were also from farming families.  
These categories were to the fore throughout the bank’s history. 
   The impression that ‘very few of the lower orders take advantage of the saving 
bank’ is confirmed by a close scrutiny of ThSB’s records.  Table 1 summarises the profile 
of savers.  It contains some expected and some perhaps surprising features.  The low 
average opening balances of servants and labourers are expected, those of tailors and 
bakers perhaps less so.  At the other end of the spectrum are landowners and gentlemen, 
the groups with the highest average maximum balance.  The closeness of opening, closing,  8 
and maximum balances for farmers, farmers’ wives, and farmers’ children suggest that 
farmers used the accounts of family members to extract maximum benefit from the bank. 
   In general the picture is of rather inactive accounts, with an average of just a few 
transactions a year.   The number of deposits typically exceeded withdrawals.  This seems 
to have been typical of nineteenth-century savings banks.4  The average closing balance 
exceeded the average opening balance in all occupational categories.  This suggests that the 
bank was used as a vehicle for accumulation.  The average account was held for about five 
years, with little variation here across occupations or parishes.  However, it was quite 
common for account-holders to close their accounts and re-open another later.  The 
significant proportion of accounts in the names of children (11 per cent) and juveniles (12 
per cent) again suggests that these were used to circumvent the rules. 
 
 
3. FAMINE, PANICS AND CONTAGION   
  In earlier work Kelly and Ó Gráda (2000) and Ó Gráda and White (2003) employed 
the records of a major U.S. savings bank, the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, to study 
two panics striking New York in the 1850s.  The first of these, that of December 1854, 
was a local affair affecting only savings banks, while the second, that of October 1857, had 
global ramifications.  The EISB was founded in 1850 to provide an outlet for the savings 
of Irish immigrants; in the 1850s its clientele was mainly, though by no means exclusively, 
Irish.  The two studies sought to identify what distinguished those individuals who 
panicked during the panic from those who kept their accounts open.  As such they differ 
from most studies of banking panics, which focus on banks rather than individual 
stakeholders.  Were recent immigrants more likely to panic than those already in New  9 
York for several years?  Were those in menial occupations more likely to panic than skilled 
and professional workers?  Did the duration of an account and the number of transactions 
made matter?  The focus of Kelly and Ó Gráda (2000) was on the role of informational 
networks in spreading contagion.  It highlighted the importance of regional networks 
among the Irish immigrant population.  After controlling for several other factors, 
account-holders born in certain Irish counties and living in certain New York 
neighbourhoods were much more likely to close their accounts than those in others.  The 
role of such local peer-group effects is also the focus of a recent study by Hong et al. 
(2003) on portfolio holding.   
Ó Gráda and White (2003) argued that the nature of the panic influenced the 
characteristics of those who panicked.  In particular, they claimed that the panic of 1854, 
an ‘irrational’ run provoked by the collapse of a single rogue bank, was driven by 
uninformed ‘outsiders’, while better informed account-holders were more to the fore in 
1857.  Both panics were short-lived, and involved only a small minority of account-
holders.  Table 2 summarises the outcome of estimating for the factors that affected the 
hazard that an account would be closed during the panic periods of 1854 and 1857.  In 
both cases higher cumulative deposits significantly reduced the hazard of closing an 
account, implying that the better-off were less likely to panic.  Familiarity with banking and 
with the EISB in particular, proxied by the number of previous transactions, also reduced 
the hazard.  The monthly dummies represent those opening accounts in the month of July, 
too late to qualify for the half-yearly interest due at the end of the year, and those opening 
an account on the eve of the panic of October 1854. Their coefficients, as might be 
expected, have high values.  The commercial paper rate (CPRATE) is included as an 
indicator of general economic or commercial stress.  Closures were quite sensitive to  10
CPRATE, with higher rates making closure more likely.  Neither gender nor family size 
seems to have mattered.  The impact of occupational variables on closure is less sharp.  
Labourers were not more inclined to panic in either year, but professional people were 
significantly more likely to do so in October 1857.  Nativity and years in the U.S. mattered 
in 1854 but much less so three years later.  On the basis of these results and the different 
time-paths of the two crises, Ó Gráda and White (2003) argue that contagion was more of 
a factor in 1854, while the panic of 1857 showed more signs of being led by businessmen 
and financial sophisticates. 
In the rest of this section and in Part 4 the accounts of the much smaller Thurles 
Savings Bank. are examined to gain some insight into ‘who panicked’ during two serious 
runs on that bank, in 1848 and in 1856 (Figure 2).  Though the Great Famine undoubtedly 
affected Irish savings banks, the link between it and the banks’ fortunes in the late 1840s is 
not straightforward.   Indeed in the early stages some observers suggested that the banks’ 
seeming prosperity belied Irish claims of hardship and crisis.  Editorials highlighted reports 
from Ireland of increases in deposits as evidence of ‘successful swindling’ or welfare fraud 
on the part of the people.5  However, both aggregate data and individual case studies 
would seem to confirm that the economic shock caused by the famine dealt a serious blow 
to savings banks.  Between 1845 and 1849 aggregate deposits fell from nearly £2.9 million 
to £1.2 million, and the number of depositors dropped by more than half.  Of the forty-
four savings banks in the United Kingdom that ceased business between 1844 and 1852, 
twenty-four were Irish.6 
The famine placed all Irish financial institutions under pressure, and the savings 
banks were not immune.  However, the trends in deposits and the number of accounts in 
the late 1840s are more complex than the numbers above imply.  When decline set in the  11
spatial pattern was not that predicted by our knowledge of the regional incidence of the 
famine.  Population loss between 1841 and 1851 is a good measure of the damage done by 
the famine.  By this reckoning the famine was most severe in Connacht, which lost 29 per 
cent of its people in the decade.  Munster with 22 per cent came next, well ahead of both 
Ulster (16 per cent) and Leinster (15 per cent).  The pattern for savings banks during the 
famine was quite different.  Between November 1845 and November 1846 aggregate 
deposits fell slightly, but there were rises in all provinces except Leinster (where they fell 
by 18 per cent).  Leinster’s problems were due mainly to the collapse of its second biggest 
bank (on which more below).  In 1845/6 deposits rose most in Connacht.  In 1846-7 the 
decline in deposits was greatest in Ulster (19 per cent), while in 1847-8 it was greatest in 
Leinster (53 per cent) and least in Connacht (34 per cent). 
  Financial contagion, not the famine per se, was responsible for the major run 
against the country’s savings banks in mid-1848.  The run led to a huge decline in deposits 
and account numbers from which the banks never truly recovered.  The run exposed a 
weakness in their original design.  In Ireland the record of the savings banks in this respect 
was quite good:  only one serious case of embezzlement came to light before the late 
1840s.  But this and two more in April 1848 were enough to give rise to a panic that 
almost destroyed the whole system. 
The collapse of St. Peter’s Parish Savings Bank in Dublin was notable for being ‘the 
first real sign of a chink in the armour designed by Parliament’.  That bank had been the 
target of embezzlement and mismanagement since the 1820s, and probably should have 
been closed in 1831.7   Mismanagement continued to be a problem.  A run on the bank in 
November 1845 marked the beginning of the end.  When it closed its doors on 10 May 
1848 its liabilities had reached nearly £65,000 against assets of £100 or so.  Sensing that  12
the game was up and that compensation was unlikely some depositors of St. Peter’s Parish 
Savings Bank began to sell their passbooks at a discount in the following week.8   
Much more damaging were the sensational, unrelated collapses of the Tralee and 
Killarney savings banks in April 1848.  First to go was the Tralee bank, in the wake of a 
confession by its actuary that he had embezzled it over an extended period.9  He had run 
the business from his own house, ‘which afforded him considerable latitude for carrying 
on his frauds’.  Since depositors called at all hours with their deposits there were no 
managers present to check entries.  One of his scams worked as follows.  Deposits of £30, 
£15, and £27 would be entered as £3, £5, and £7, and a sum of £15 added to the coffers.  
The manager would see that the sum lodged matched the entries.  Then the actuary would 
add a zero to the £3 and change the £5 to £15 and the £7 to £27, so that depositors who 
came to claim their money would get it.  In this way suspicions were not aroused.  The 
actuary, on a salary of £60, pocketed about £28,000 between 1832 and 1848, though in 
1848 ‘he appeared to have had but £3,000 realised’.  He had built up liabilities of £36,768 
against £1,650 assets for which he got 14 years’ transportation.10   The Killarney Savings 
Bank, which held over one thousand accounts, closed its doors on 18 April 1848.  In this 
case the actuary, one D.W. Murphy, fled, leaving liabilities of £36,000 against assets of 
£16,582. 
An official arbitrator, John Tidd Pratt, was appointed to look into the plight of the 
two Kerry banks in May 1848.  His findings were highly critical of the banks’ management, 
but he found ‘the greatest abuse [had] existed on the part of the depositors, with respect to 
their mode of depositing, and the amounts they invested, as well as an utter disregard to 
the rates’.  His revelations created a sensation. Irish politicians and the press sympathised 
the depositors and berated Tidd Pratt for protecting the rich (i.e. the trustees) at the  13
expense of the poor (the account-holders).  Tidd Pratt defended himself in a letter from 
Killarney to the Freeman’s Journal in which he revealed that the average deposit in Tralee 
had been £40 ‘and in this place will exceed £50’.  He revealed that as numerous Tralee 
account-holders handed in their pass-books to the clerk in the hopes of getting some of 
their money back, it emerged that ‘some of the farming class, apparently poor, had sums to 
a surprising amount lodged  – even over a thousand pounds each’.11   Others had claimed 
sums of £800, £650, £450, £320, and so on.  In no savings bank in the United Kingdom 
had he ever found ‘so great a number of what I consider large accounts.’  It was no 
different in the case of the Killarney savings bank:  ‘tenants, who pleaded extreme poverty 
to their landlords, paupers from the workhouse, and men whose outward appearance 
would lead you to look on them as objects of charity, were soon at the office door’.12  Tidd 
Pratt reduced the claims of all depositors to those allowed by the rules, thereby drastically 
cutting the bill facing the trustees from perhaps £40,000 to about £10,000.  He added that 
his duty was ‘far from being a pleasant one’.13   
In amusing evidence to a Commons select committee on savings banks in 1849 
Tidd Pratt spoke of ‘cases where husbands brought books representing the money to be 
the property of their sisters, and upon calling the sisters it turned out to be their wives’, 
and of ‘persons producing books before me stating it was not their own property, but was 
the property of their nephews and nieces; and upon my informing them that their nephews 
and nieces must come themselves, when the children came it was quite clear that they had 
never seen the book’.   Another man ‘had a large sum of money in the bank, and it had 
been stated that if he was pressed [for rent] they must sell his bed under him, and several 
cases of that kind’.14  Tidd Pratt’s irritation at what he deemed ‘the utter disregard of truth,  14
the falsehood and subornation of perjury displayed by the claimants’ was understandable.  
Yet he was too ready to accept the assertions of some of his friendlier informants as fact.15   
  Tidd Pratt’s sensational accusations were presented on 18 May 1848.  They were 
widely circulated in the domestic and foreign press and widely repeated later.16  Henry 
Arthur Herbert, M.P. for Kerry, who declared that he had seen them in the Augsburg 
Gazette, vigorously rebutted them.  Against the claim that three men in jail for debt ‘had 
presented themselves in custody of their gaolers to claim as depositors’, Herbert produced 
a letter from the prison governor that ‘no such circumstance ever occurred’.  Tidd Pratt 
was forced to withdraw his accusation before a committee of the House of Commons in 
1849.17  Another widely-circulated claim that inmates had left Killarney workhouse in 
search of their deposits was also probably a fiction.  Herbert was given the names of four 
workhouse inmates who, according to the master, applied for dismissal at the time of Tidd 
Pratt’s hearings, and ‘whom some of the inmates of the workhouse had accused, in a 
joking way, of having money in the bank’.  Herbert engaged a friend to search the list of 
applicants appearing before Tidd Pratt for the four names, but none could be found.18 
The impact of the sensational failures in Dublin and Kerry was far-reaching.  In 
Cork the trustees of the local bank were forced to withdraw £45,000 of their investment in 
the national debt during the first half of April 1848 in order to meet a serious run.  At the 
other end of the country in Belfast there was a serious run on the savings bank ‘by nervous 
and doubtful depositors’.19 In Thurles the disaster resulted in more accounts being closed 
in 1848 than in any other year in ThSB’s history.  Between April and September 1848 322 
accounts were closed.  Depositors were slow to return to the savings banks, and recovery 
was impeded by a more aggressive search for accounts on the part of the joint-stock banks 
after mid-century.  The National Bank began to accept deposits of ten shillings or more at  15
the current rate of interest.  The fragility of the savings banks after 1848 is well reflected in 
the run that spread from Cork to Dublin in 1853, stemming from a rumour that the Cork 
Savings Bank had closed for good, when in fact it was merely refurbishing its facilities.20 
  Were those who panicked in 1848 systematically different from those who held 
their nerve?  We have already addressed this question in the very different context of the 
Emigrant Savings Bank.21  In Table 3 we first compare the panickers (approximated by 
those who closed accounts between April and September 1848) with four other sets of 
account-holders: first, the 341 account-holders who closed their accounts in 1843-5; 
second, the 384 who closed in between January 1847 and March 1848; third, the 310 who 
closed in 1849-51; and finally, the 482 who held accounts in March 1848 but chose not to 
close them in the following months.   
  Note first the apparent absence of any strong gender affect: women, it seems, 
were slightly less inclined to panic, but the difference in the proportion of female closers in 
the five groups is small.  The opening and closing balances of those who panicked hardly 
differed from the balances of those who did not.  Account-holders with addresses in 
Thurles were slightly more inclined to panic but again the effect is small.  There is little 
evidence of panickers clustering by parish.  Two differences are more significant.  During 
the panic account-holders with the same surname and address were more likely to close.  
Farmers and members of farming households were also more likely to close, while people 
of means, such as landowners, clergy, and professionals, were less likely to do so.  It is 
hardly surprising that when parents closed accounts, they also closed those of their 
children.  That networks of occupation, sex, or parish did not register may reflect secrecy 
about accounts.  That servants and labourers were also marginally more likely to keep their 
accounts open is perhaps more surprising.    16
  Table 4 offers a more formal analysis.  It describes the outcome of four slightly 
different logit specifications of ‘who panicked’.  The dependent variable is set at unity for 
accounts closed during the panic period, and zero otherwise.  The explanatory variables 
are as follows. thurl means an address in the town of Thurles; inner and outer refer to 
addresses in an inner and outer ring of parishes around Thurles; relpanic is set at one if the 
account of a relation is closed during the panic; whcollar includes landowners, those 
described as ‘esq.’, corndealers, and professionals; ric represents members of the Royal 
Irish Constabulary; prole includes mainly labourers and servants.  Spinster and minor are self-
explanatory.  The other covariates refer to particulars of each account: dateop (when the 
account opened); avl (lodgements per day); avw (withdrawls per day); l4548 (lodgements in 
1845-48); w4548 (withdrawals in 1845-48); opbal (opening balance); op45 (balance in 1845); 
cl48 (balance in 1848); totdep (total sum deposited); and max (maximum deposit).  The 
coefficients in Table 4 are the marginal effects of a change in each variable, and the 
associated t-statistics.  The unimportance of gender is confirmed.  Nor did location matter 
much; indeed those living in the outer ring of parishes were most likely to panic.  Farmers 
and unskilled workers were more likely to panic, members of the police force and the 
wealthy were less inclined to do so.  Note that relpanic is big and significant throughout.  
The longer an account had been open the less likely it was to close: perhaps some accounts 
were effectively dormant in 1848.  The busier an account, as reflected in avl and avw, the 
more likely it was to close. The more on deposit in the account in 1848 (cl48) the less likely 
it was to close.  Big accounts, represented by max and totdep, were also less likely to close.  
Overall, the impression is of the less well off being more inclined to panic.  The strong 
tendency for family members to act together is striking.  One interpretation of this is the 
importance of the family as an informational network.  In other words, in Thurles the  17
decisions of siblings or other family members mattered more than those of neighbours.  
But there is a more mundane interpretation too.  That family members should act in 
concert is perhaps not so surprising, given that in many cases trust accounts in the names 
of sons and daughters were managed by parents, and indeed used as a means of 
circumventing the rules about maximum lodgements and sums deposited. 
  The panic of 1848 had a lasting effect on Irish savings banks.  Deposits would 
never recover their pre-panic level.  The failure of the banks exposed a shortcoming in the 
design of savings banks, and undermined popular confidence in them.  In all cases the 
trustees had failed in their responsibility to monitor the bank’s actuary.  The abuse of the 
system highlighted by Tidd Pratt made those with substantial deposits in the savings banks 
doubly nervous.  There is thus a sense in which both the panic and the subsequent 
reluctance to use savings banks were ‘rational’ reactions.  However, it is also noteworthy 
that an equally sensational collapse less than two years later in England did not have the 
same effect.  On the death of George Haworth, actuary of the Rochdale Savings Bank, in 
November 1849 it was discovered that he had defrauded depositors of over £70,000. 
Haworth had been using the bank to fund his foundering cotton mill.  Despite this and a 
series of other smaller defalcations the aggregate sum deposited in English savings banks 
continued to rise during the 1850s, as aggregate deposits in Ireland fell.22   
 
 
4. THE PANIC OF 1856 
It is may seem a long way to Tipperary from Charles Dickson and Anthony 
Trollope.  Yet Mr. Merdle in Little Dorrit (1857) and, to a lesser extent, Augustine 
Melmotte in The Way We Live Now (1875) were modelled on a real-life, notorious  18
Tipperaryman.  Like Merdle and Melmotte, John Sadleir M.P. committed suicide in the 
face of financial scandals.  Sadleir, a controversial figure in Irish politics, lived mostly in 
London.  From there he exercised full control over the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank, which 
had been established in 1840 by his uncle James Scully, and was managed by his brother 
James.  John’s suicide on Hampstead Heath on the night of 16-17 February 1856 was 
prompted by the refusal of both Messrs. Glynn in London and the Bank of Ireland in 
Dublin to cash any further drafts on the Tipperary Bank, and by the imminent disclosure 
of Sadleir’s role in various embezzlement schemes.  In the following days the inquest into 
Sadleir’s death and revelations about his various scams figured prominently in the British 
and Irish press. 
The sensational failure of the Tipperary Bank, with liabilities of £0.4 million against 
assets of about £45,000, had far-reaching ramifications in Ireland.  Most Irish banks came 
under pressure in the following months, though by the end of the year the crisis was 
over.23  In Thurles, where the business of the local branch of the Tipperary Bank had been 
‘rather extensive’, both the National Bank and ThSB came under some pressure in the 
weeks following the collapse.  In the immediate aftermath of the collapse a police presence 
was required to protect the Tipperary Bank’s premises against angry farmers.  A local 
newspaper claimed that the panic did not extend beyond ‘the small farmer class’.24   
             Were there any discernible differences between those people driven to close their 
accounts in ThSB in February and March 1856 and those who closed in ‘normal’ times?  
Table 5 compares the seventy-five accounts closed during February and March 1856 with 
the 199 closed in 1853-55 and the 191 closed in 1857-58.  The profiles are quite similar in 
most respects.  However, both average opening and closing balances were higher during 
the panic than before it; farmers, members of farming families, and labourers were much  19
more prominent among closers in 1856 than either before or after; and those who 
withdrew during the panic were much more likely to be people with the same surname as 
other closers.  Policemen, landowners, professional people, and the gentry were less 
inclined to panic.  This is consistent with the suggestion that family networks were an 
influence on the decision to close an account. 
  The collapse was unfortunate for ThSB in another respect.  For many years 
ThSB had held a balance of several hundred pounds with the National Bank.  When the 
National Bank announced a reduction in the rate of interest on this sum from 2.5 to two 
per cent in mid-1855, the account was moved to Sadleir’s bank.25  The decision, which cost 
ThSB nearly five hundred pounds, would haunt it till the end.  As resultant economy 
measures, the trustees were forced in November 1858 to reduce the actuary’s salary by £10 
and in May 1859 to reduce the interest payable on deposits to 2.5 per cent.26  Had ThSB’s 
loss been more widely known at the time, the run on it would surely have been more 
sustained. 
  Had it been widely known that shortly before the collapse the trustees of ThSB 
had transferred their account from the National Bank to the Tipperary Bank, the run on 
ThSB would surely have been more sustained.  For many years ThSB had held a balance of 
several hundred pounds with the National, money that should technically have been 
deposited with the National Debt Office.  When the National Bank announced in mid-
1855 that it was about to reduce the rate of interest on those deposits from 2.5 to two per 
cent, whereas the Tipperary Bank guaranteed 2.5 per cent, the account was moved to 
Sadleir’s bank.  The decision, which cost ThSB nearly five hundred pounds, would haunt it 
till the end.  As resultant economy measures, the trustees were forced in November 1858  20
to reduce the actuary’s salary by £10 and in May 1859 to reduce the interest payable on 




  The paper began with a brief account of the early history of Irish savings banks.  It 
noted that, to an even greater extent than in England and even more so than in Scotland, 
Irish savings banks benefited disproportionately the comfortably off.  While some poor 
people undoubtedly benefited, it is clear that the lion’s share of the benefits went to a 
minority of relatively affluent account-holders.  Paradoxically, Ireland’s relative 
backwardness accounts in part for the disproportionate role of the rich as beneficiaries.   
Ireland’s relative backwardness also may also partly account for the vulnerability of 
its savings banks to another form of abuse.  The embezzlement and collapse of three 
banks in a single year (1848) was bad enough in itself, but more serious for the survival of 
the system as a whole was that the financial contagion that resulted.  Nonetheless these 
and other lesser swindles exposed a serious weakness in the system more generally.  They 
prompted a debate about alternatives to savings banks and facilitated the adoption of 
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Table 2. Modelling EISB Account-Holders in 1854 and 1857 
 
 
                             1854                1857 
VARIABLE  Hazard Ratio     P(z)    Hazard Ratio  P(z) 
Cum. Deposits   0.999    0.006     0.999   0.002 
Transactions   0.855    0.000     0.902   0.000 
July 1854   3.599    0.000       
Oct 1854   3.397    0.000       
July 1857         9.925   0.000 
CPRATE   1.149    0.000     1.329   0.000 
Female   0.994    0.970     1.044   0.760 
Married   1.726    0.001     1.334   0.095 
No. children   0.929    0.130     0.943   0.195 
Unskilled   1.109    0.535     1.001   0.993 
Professional   0.445    0.098     1.635   0.118 
Years in U.S.   0.963    0.019     0.994   0.660 
Ulster   1.585    0.125     0.785   0.323 
Connacht   3.507    0.000     0.979   0.928 
Leinster   3.106    0.000     0.993   0.974 
Munster   4.439    0.000     0.949   0.796 
            
No. obs  657      589   




TABLE 5: ACCOUNTS CLOSED 1853-8 
 
     1853-1855    Feb-Mar 1856     1857-58 
Number      199           75      191 
Female    (%)     45.7    46.7    37.7 
Avg.  Opening  Balance  (£)    17.5    20.7    19.0 
Avg.  Closing  Balance  (£)      23.3    29.8    28.1 
Avg. Date open        Oct 50      Dec 49                Nov 54 
Thurles  address  (%)    34.4    36.7    37.7 
In  trust    (%)     32.7    38.7    44.0 
Withdrew at same as another  
    with same surname/address (%)    23.6      50.7      40.3 
 
 
Status or occupation where given (%) 
 Farming  (incl  family)     30.1      47.9    28.2 
  Labourers, servants, dealers, etc.   11.5       18.3      10.7 
  Married women, widows, spinsters   26.9       20.0      27.5 
 Minors           5.4          4.2    13.0 
  Gents, corndealers, doctors      5.4         1.4        6.9 
  RIC           5.4         1.4        2.3 
 Other       14.6          6.8    10.7 
     100.0    100.0    100.0 
  Not given         69         19      59 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 3: CLOSURES BEFORE AND DURING THE PANIC OF 1848 
 
      Closed     Closed               Closed      Closed    Open in March ‘48 
            1844-5       Jan ‘47-Mar ‘48        Apr-Sept ‘48           1849-51  but did not close 
Number      341      384      322    310     482 
Female    (%)      41.1    38.8    41.0    45.5     41.9 
Avg.  Opening  Balance  (£)    18.7    20.0    21.3    18.0     19.4 
Avg.  Closing  Balance  (£)      23.6    26.5    29.7    18.4     32.4 
Avg. Date open        Sept 40    Aug 43    Dec 43    Dec 44    Sept 41 
Address  in  Thurles  (%)    41.9    43.0    35.4    47.7     39.4 
      Moycarkey (%)          7.0       8.6        9.3        8.0       
      Holycross (%)          6.5      10.2      12.8        6.5       
      Drom (%)          6.7       9.1        7.8        7.1       
In  trust    (%)      41.1    47.4    47.8    47.7    37.3   
Withdrew in same month as another  
      with  same  surname/address  (%)   22.9    38.3    43.5    21.6         -- 
Status or occupation (%) 
      Farming  (incl  family)    40.4      44.6      47.5    35.3       32.2 
   Labourers, servants, dealers, etc.    16.4       12.9       13.2      11.3       10.7 
   Married women, widows, spinsters  20.8       20.9       19.0      24.0       16.2 
   Minors           4.8         9.4         7.0       6.3         8.1 
   Gents, corndealers, doctors     8.0         1.7         2.5       8.0         3.7 
   RIC            1.6         2.1         0.4       2.5         2.7 
   Other given          8.0         8.3        10.3      12.6         8.9 
      Total  given      100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0     100.0 
   Not given           91          97          80      72         83 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 1: PROFILES OF THURLES ACCOUNT HOLDERS 1829-1870 
 
STATUS      NO.    AVG. OPENING     AVG. CLOSING      AVG. MAX          TOTAL    AVG. NO.  AVG. NO.      AVG.    AVG. 
          BALANCE (£)        BALANCE (£)     BALANCE (£)          DEPOSITS (£)    LDGMTS    WTHDRLS   DURATION TRANS. 
 
Baker        25      7      13         17      24     12.4       2.3    1.8    8.2 
Servant     215      8      13         18      24       4.9       2.2     5.2    1.4 
Labourer      83    13      13         19      29       3.9       3.4     3.4    2.1 
Tailor        15      8      14         18      26       4.8       3.8    2.8    3.1 
Dealer        30    13      17         27      46       7.4       5.3    4.1    3.1 
 
Esquire       57    24      32         47      75       4.3       2.3    4.1    1.6 
Landowner      26    21      46         54      64       3.8       2.4     3.9    1.6 
 
Farmer     574    24      31         41      55       3.0       2.4     4.4    1.3 
Farmer’s dghtr.    136    23      32         40      47       2.3       1.2    4.2    0.8 
Farmer’s son    205    25      35         43      54       2.4       1.2    5.2    0.7 
Farmer’s wife    169    23      35         44      50       2.6       1.6    4.6    0.9 
   
Minor      262    18      29         38      48       5.9       1.7    5.5    1.4 
Policeman      86    16      27         32      34       4.0       1.9    4.2    1.4 
Married woman    323    18      25         33      45       5.4       2.2     3.6    2.1 
Spinster     349    19      29         36      47       5.6       1.7    4.3    1.7 
Widow      112    20      23         34      42       3.4       3.4    4.6    1.5 
Catholic curate       36    22      25         34      42       2.5       1.8    3.5    1.2 
 
Male    2387    20      26         34      44       3.8       2.0    4.0    1.5 
Female    1826    17      25         32      40       4.5       1.9    4.2    1.5 
 
Total    4213    19      26         33      43       4.2       2.0    4.1    1.5 
 
Thurles   1768    16      21         29      40       5.8       2.3    3.8    2.1 
Other    2445    21      29         37      44       2.9       1.7    4.3    1.1 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________   27 
 




Number of obs              836           838               837       837 
Prob > chi2          0.0000        0.0000            0.0000                 0.0000 
Log likelihood       -444.7756    -445.21242         -430.98343      -444.82512                
Pseudo R2               0.2200        0.2208            0.2449               0.2207 
                
Marginal Effects 
         [1]      [2]      [3]        [4]                                             
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
variable |    dy/dx       z      |     dy/dx        z     |        dy/dx        z   |        dy/dx        z  |    mean value 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sex |    .0057      0.14    |           |                |        |  .441388 
   thurl*|    .0427      0.40    |           |                |        |  .376794 
   inner*|    .1442      1.35    |   .1066      2.19    |     .1228        2.48    |   .1371       2.97     |  .429426 
   outer*|    .0838      0.72    |   .0450      0.71    |     .0711        1.09    |   .0893       1.42      |  .154306 
relpanic*|    .4668      9.15    |   .4685      9.19    |     .4552        8.29    |   .4343       8.02      |      .117225 
whcollar*|   -.0440     -0.42    |  -.0446     -0.44    |    -.0745       -0.75    |  -.0906      -0.96     |  .045455 
     ric*|         |           |    -.2621       -2.45    |  -.2531      -2.25     |  .016726 
 farming*|    .0823      1.57    |   .0782      1.55    |      .0409        0.78    |          |  .319378 
   prole*|    .0668      0.91    |   .0673      0.92    |                  |        |  .089713 
spinster*|           |           |    -.1712       -2.39    |   -.2024      -3.09     |  .070490 
   minor*|         |           |    -.0936       -1.19    |  -.0903      -1.16     |  .068100   
  dateop |   -.0000     -1.64    |  -.0000     -1.80    |    -.0001       -3.03    |   -.0000      -2.22     |  15700.0 
     avl |    96.40      6.15    |   96.82      6.30    |     103.5        6.45    |    94.57       6.17       | .002581 
     avw |    8.839      0.80    |   8.145      0.96    |     14.84        1.66    |      7.970       1.04     |  .001485 
   l4548 |   -.0265     -2.50    |  -.0273     -2.64    |    -.0308       -2.64    |    -.0429      -3.45     |  2.19378 
   w4548 |   -.0016     -0.12    |           |               |         |  1.50000 
   opbal |    .0097      3.88    |   .0099      4.20    |      .0096        4.12    |    .0074       3.39     |  20.1352 
   clbal |          |             |     .0041        3.14    |   .0048       3.92     |  31.1750 
    op45 |    .0004      0.27    |           |                 |        |  29.5556 
    cl48 |    .0027      2.25    |   .0030      3.49    |      .0045        3.27    |   .0050       3.87  |  31.1453 
  totdep |   -.0049     -7.30    |  -.0049     -7.61    |    -.0035       -4.54    |           |  68.0419 
     max |           |           |    -.0064       -4.03    |  -.0106      -7.74  |  47.1153 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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